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The Estimated Economic Impact 
of Alternative Levels of 
Harmonized Farm Commodity Price Supports 
in the European Community 
The Single European Act, amending the 1957 Treaty of Rome and ratified by all member states of the 
European Community (EC) in 1987, will attempt to remove EC internal economic borders by the end of 1992. 
The so-called "Europe 1992" plan will attempt to harmonize standards and regulations and eliminate nontariff 
barriers which continue to restrain trade among EC countries. 
Farm commodity support prices are established each. year uniformly for all EC countries in European 
Currency Units (ECUs). However, within each country, local support prices change as national currency 
exchange rates change relative to ECUs. Ability of individual countries to change real exchange rates by 
arbitrarily establishing a unique exchange rate relative to the ECU gave rise to so called "green rates" of exchange 
for agriculture. The original rationale for allowing adjustments for agriculture from established ECU-local 
currency exchange rates was to permit a country to hold steady nominal local farm support prices. However, 
in reality the impact is for each country to set its own unique real support rate. Real agricultural support prices 
differ substantially among countries of the EC, sacrificing a truly "common" agricultural policy. Monetary 
Compensatory Amounts (MCAs), a system of border taxes and subsidies, are interventions designed to avoid 
market arbitrage by precisely offsetting differences in price supports among countries. 
Table 1 illustrates the price setting process among commodities. The European Commission determines 
yearly price changes in ECUs. The Council of Agricultural Ministers then translates the ECU changes set by 
the Commission into national currencies using green rates. The green rate not only stabilizes local support, it 
allows manipulation of prices. The data in Table 1 show that despite Commission recommendations to hold or 
drop nominal prices, the Council r~ised prices for most commodities in 1986-87. This is the usual practice. 
1 
Table 1. Nominal Price Changes by the Commission and Council for 1986-1987 Crop Year. 
Product 
Soft Wheat (for bread) 
Durum Wheat 
Barley 
Rye (for bread) 
Corn (Maize) 
Paddy Rice 
Sugar 
Rapeseed 
Sunflower 
Milk 
Beef 
Pork 
Sheepmeat 
Average of All Products 
Change in 
ECU 
0.0 
- 4.0 
- 5.0 
- 1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
- 0.3 
(percent) 
Change in 
National 
Currency 
+ 2.1 
+ 0.5 
- 3.7 
- 0.7 
+ 2.7 
+ 5.4 
+ 1.8 
+ 1.1 
+ 1.9 
+ 2.2 
+ 2.4 
+ 1.8 
+ 5.0 
+ 2.2 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the Community 1987 Report. 
Table 2 shows how green rate conversion allows nationalization of support policies among countries. 
Although commodity prices measured in ECUs declined from 1986 to 1987, the changes measured in national 
currency reflect nation<M policy goals for that year. Small deviations of commodity or national prices from the 
EC average in any one year can accumulate to large differences over many years as will be noted later. 
The intent of Europe 1992 is to eliminate green rates and MCAs by the end of 1992 as a proposed 
monetary union among member states makes harmonized price supports among countries possible. Few believe 
this union and all internal border restrictions will be removed within the stated time frame, however. However 
of interest is what would happen to production, consumption, and trade if restrictions were eliminated. 
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Table 2. Average Change in CAP Prices by Country for 1986-1987 Crop Year. 
Country 
F.R. Germany 
France 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
ECU 
Change 
" 0.2 
"0.3 
"0.6 
0.0 
" 0.1 
" 0.1 
"0.5 
" 0.3 
"0.7 
" 0.5 
+ 1.8 
+ 0.3 
(percent) 
National 
Currency 
Change 
" 0.2 
+ 2.0 
+ 4.2 
0.0 
+ 1.7 
+ 1.7 
+ 1.9 
+ 2.5 
+ 1.3 
+13.5 
+ 3.3 
+ 1.7 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the Community 1987 Report. 
Some excellent literature (e.g., Cecchini eta!.; Hallberg; Josling; Kelch) outlines the expected outcomes 
of Europe 1992. Cecchini eta!. predict that Europe 1992 will restrain consumer prices 4.5 to 7.7 percent and 
will increase Gross Domestic Product by 3.2 to 5.7 percent -- the latter implying benefits of over $300 billion per 
year. The so called "Groupe Mac" report (see Swinbank, Annex) identified annual net benefits of $531 million 
to $1,152 million from removal of selected non-tariff barriers alone. 
We are unaware of any study which examines the impacts of harmonizing Ec farm price supports on 
U.S. and EC agricultural and food production, consumption, and trade. The objective of this paper is to provide 
such estimates. Because EC farm price support levels for 1992 have not been specified, this analysis presumes 
that supports will be set somewhere between the relatively low rates of the United Kingdom and the high rates 
of Italy. 
Conceptual Framework 
The impacts of harmonization depend on the magnitude of the adjustments as the European Community 
moves to a common support level and also on whether the Community is an exporter or importer of 
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commodities. Trade reversal, where the EC changes from an importer to an exporter (or vice versa) as supports 
change, poses unique issues which will be addressed in this section along with examples of consistently being an 
exporter or importer as support prices change. 
The European Economic Community was a major net importer of agricultural commodities including 
food grains when the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was initiated in 1963. Table 3 illustrates that from 
1973 to 1985, a period which included rising price supports and increasing production efficiency, self-sufficiency 
increased significantly in several major commodities. Some commodities imported in 1973 were exported by 
1985. 
We now summarize conceptually the welfare impacts within the EC and for the rest of the world with 
EC price harmonization -- first when the EC is an importer, second when it is an exporter, and third when it 
switches trade status. We shall observe that who gains and who loses with harmonization depends on the 
direction and magnitude of price changes. 
Table 3. EC Self-Sufficiency for Selected Commodities. 
Commodity 
Wheat 
Corn 
Sugar 
Beef 
Vegetable Oils 
1973 
97 
54 
92 
95 
25 
1985 
(percent) 
146 
86 
132 
108 
48 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Agricultural Facts and Figures, 1987. 
Imported Commodities 
The Community (EC-12) has been and will continue to be an importer of some commodities. In Figure 
1, demand d and supply sin the EC-12 for the imported commodity and D and S respectively in the rest of the 
world (ROW) give rise to equilibrium world price Pw in the absence of transportation costs.1 Domestic 
consumption <Jc and production qP in the EC-12 and of Oc and QP respectively in ROW give rise to imports qc-
qP into the EC-12 equal to exports OP - Oc of ROW. The variable levy pd - Pr under the CAP raises the 
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domestic price in the EC-12 to pd and reduces the price in ROW top,., lowering imports of the EC-12 to q'c-
q'P and exports of ROW to Q'P - O'c . 
The welfare impact is as follows: 
Gain to: 
Producers 
Consumers 
Taxpayers 
Region 
World (c=S) 
Price 
0 
EC-12 
Figure 1. Impact of a Levy on Imports. 
Price 
Quantity 0 
1 
-1-2-3-4 
3 + 5 
-2-4+5 
-a-b-e-d 
a 
-b-e-d 
-2-4-b-d. 
ROW 
Quantity 
Producer surplus under the CAP is increased by area 1 in the EC-12 and is reduced by area a + b + c + d in 
ROW. Consumer surplus is reduced by area 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 in the EC-12 while it is raised by area a in ROW. 
The import levy generates additional revenues to government or taxpayers in the EC-12 equal to area 3 + 5. 
The net welfare gain to the EC-12, area -2 - 4 + 5, is positive if area 5 exceeds area 2 + 4. ROW is 
unequivocally a loser of area b + c + d from the CAP under assumptions of Figure 1. The world also is a loser 
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-- the deadweight welfare loss is area 2 + 4 + b + d. If Europe 1992 reduces the import levy, the magnitude 
of the welfare loss will fall; if the levy increases in magnitude, the welfare loss will rise. 
Exported Commodities 
The EC-12 increasingly is an exporter of agricultural commodities with impacts as indicated in Figure 
2 using notation defined for Figure 1. In the absence of market interventions, at equilibrium world price Pw 
exports CJp- q. from the EC-12 equal imports Oc- QP by ROW. Export subsidies (restitution payments) pd- Pr 
per unit hold domestic price in the EC-12 above the price in ROW. 
EC-12 ROW 
Price Price 
d 8 
I I 
p :2 4: 
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I I I & I 
I I I I l--+-- --t--J f!. 1 
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I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
0~---------------------- 0~--------------------­q q q q Quantlty a· a a a· Quantity 
c c p p p c c 
Figure 2. Impact of a Subsidy on Exports. 
Welfare effects in Figure 2 are depicted as follows: 
Gain to: 
Producers 
Consumers 
Taxpayers 
Region 
World (5=b+c+d) 
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1 + 2 + 3 
- 1- 2 
-2-3-4-5 
- 2 - 4 - 5 
-a-b 
a+ b + c 
c 
-2-4-b-d. 
Welfare gain in the EC-12 to producers of area 1 + 2 + 3 is more than offset by losses to consumers (area 1 
+ 2) and taxpayers (area 2 + 3 + 4 + 5), leaving a net deadweight welfare loss to the EC-12 of area 2 + 4 + 
5. Welfare gain to consumers of area a + b + c in ROW more than offsets the loss to producers of a + b, 
leaving a net welfare gain to ROW of area c in Figure 2. The gain to ROW falls short of the loss to the EC-
12 so the world experiences a welfare loss of area 2 + 4 + b + d from the export subsidy of the EC. A 
reduction of the export subsidy under Europe 1992 diminishes the welfare effects; a rise in the export subsidy 
raises the welfare effects. 
Trade Reversal 
Figure 1 assumes the EC is an importer before and after market intervention; Figure 2 assumes the EC 
is an exporter before and after market intervention. Interventions of the EC sometimes result in trade reversal, 
shifting the EC from an importer in the absence of interventions to an exporter with interventions. Impacts are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
EC-12 ROW 
Price Price 
d 8 
D s 
pd 
pw 
• 
Pr 
0 0 
q 
qc Quantity a aP Quantity p c 
qc q a~ a~ p 
Figure 3. Impact of a Subsidy Causing Trade Reversal. 
An export subsidy of pd- Pr causes the EC to shift from an importer of qc- qP (equal to exports QP-
Oc from ROW) at world equilibrium price Pw without market distortion to an exporter of q'P- q'c (equal to Q'c-
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a·P in ROW). The assumption that imports before intervention equal exports after intervention is strictly a 
convenience to simplify Figure 3. 
Welfare impacts are as follows: 
Gain to: 
Producers 
Consumers 
Taxpayers 
Region 
World (6=b+c+d+e) 
1 + 2 + 3 
- 1 - 2 - 5 
-2-3-4-5-6 
-2-4-5-5-6 
-a-b-c 
a+ b + e 
- c + e 
-2-4-5-5-b-c-c-~ 
The gains to producers in the EC of area 1 + 2 + 3 are exceeded by losses to consumers of area 1 + 2 + 5 and 
to taxpayers of area 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6, leaving a net deadweight welfare loss of 2 + 4 + 5 + 5 + 6 to the EC. 
Losses to producers in ROW of area a + b + c combined with a gain to consumers of area a + b + e leave a 
net welfare gain of area -c + e. The latter will be positive if e exceeds c. 
The welfare loss to the world is area 2 + 4 + 5 + 5 + b + c + c + d. The net welfare gains from free 
trade, area 5 in the EC-12 and area c in ROW, are counted twice as welfare losses to the world with trade 
reversal. That is (1) because the opportunity is foregone by EC-12 consumers to utilize a commodity valued 
more by them than its opportunity cost of production and (2) at the same time producing locally at an expense 
in excess of the opportunity cost of production. 
Under the narrow assumptions of linear supply and demand curves and exact trade reversal in Figure 
3, world deadweight loss is equal to the total export subsidy (pd - Pr times q'c - q'p) of the EC becal,lSe area 3 
equals area 5 and area c equals area e. This illustrates that trade reversal can exact a relatively large welfare 
loss especially on the country or community providing the export subsidy. 
The above conceptual framework indicates that the incidence and magnitude of impacts of market 
interventions vary with the type and size of the market intervention. For the 1985-87 period, the picture is mixed 
(Table 4). Presumably, one reason for EC market intervention is food security. By inclusive definition, the EC 
was a net importer of agricultural products of $15.6 billion on average for the three years 1985-87. A more 
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exclusive definition omits natural rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and tobacco because these are not essential 
for food security. By that definition, the EC trade deficit was $7.0 billion. 
On theoretical grounds alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the EC is a net gainer or loser from 
market intervention of the CAP although the analysis indicates that the world as a whole is worse off. Who gains 
and who loses from changes in market interventions associated with Europe 1992 is an empirical question 
addressed in the subsequent quantitative analysis. 
Table 4. European Community (EC-12) Agricultural Exports, Imports and Net Exports, 1985-87 Average. 
(a) (b) (a· b) 
Commodity Exports Imports Net Exports 
($million) 
Live animals 3277.6 3347.2 -69.6 
Meat and meat preparations 11868.9 11850.8 18.1 
Dairy products and eggs 10909.5 8596.0 2313.5 
Cereals and cereal preparations 11197.1 9205.5 1991.6 
Wheat and flour 4243.4 2944.4 1299.0 
Rice 608.3 698.3 -90.0 
Feed grains 3288.7 3419.0 -130.3 
Fruit and vegetables 13135.4 18274.1 -5138.7 
Sugar, sugar preparations, and honey 2668.6 2522.5 146.1 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, etc. 4505.7 11384.3 -6878.6 
Animal feed 3653.7 6898.6 -3244.9 
Miscellaneous food preparations 3197.2 2139.8 1057.4 
Beverages 9940.6 5358.5 4582.1 
Tobacco, unmanufactured 508.3 2167.4 -1659.1 
Tobacco, manufactured 2627.1 1894.0 733.1 
Hides, skins, and furs undressed 2132.2 3114.6 -982.4 
Oilseeds, oil, nuts, and oil kernels 1459.8 5170.9 -3711.1 
Natural rubber 26.8 819.3 -792.5 
Natural fibers 1785.0 5139.3 -3354.3 
Crude animal and vegetable materials 
not elsewhere specified 4670.8 4907.2 -236.4 
Agricultural fats and oils 3663.4 4071.9 -408.5 
Total agricultural 91237.5 106869.5 -15632.0 
Total 794359.7 795448.3 -1088.6 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Empirical Analysis 
The impact of Europe 1992 will depend on the many changes forthcoming in policies of the European 
Community but only the impacts of a change in agricultural commodity price support levels are considered 
herein. Prices differ within the EC as apparent in Table 5. In general, Italy provides the highest and the United 
Kingdom the lowest level of supports. Prices for 11 major commodities are supported above or near the average 
of the EC in Italy and below or near the average of the EC in the U.K. It is apparent that the impact on 
production, consumption, trade, and world prices will be quite different if the EC adopts the lowest price 
common denominator of the U.K. compared to the highest common denominator of Italy. Impacts on trade, 
world prices, and other variables were calculated assuming prices of the U.K., Italy, and an average of the EC-
12. As expected, the latter number comes close to recent performance. 
The Model 
The world trade model used to estimate the impact of price harmonization was created in the USDA 
SWOPSIM framework (Roningen). A unique characteristic of this model is the inclusion of trade functions and 
parameters for individual countries in the EC. The model is a static, nonspatial, price equilibrium formulation 
incorporating the assumptions of neoclassical trade theory. The model was initialized using USDA-developed, 
medium-term (5-year) elasticities in the behavioral equations. Supply, demand, trade, and price data are from 
the ERS ST86 (1986) database. Eleven agricultural commodities are modeled: beef, pork, milk, butter, cheese, 
dairy powder, wheat, corn, other coarse grains, soybeans, and sugar. Behavioral equations allow for interactions 
between commodities and substitution in consumption and production. Trade regions modeled include the U.S., 
Japan, and the European Community (EC). Initializing price and quantity data as well as transmission elasticities 
in the model reflect market distortions. World price transmission elasticities are less than one for regions or 
countries to the degree they isolate their domestic markets. 
The world trade model was utilized to estimate impacts of EC price harmonization on farm and food 
commodity prices, production, consumption, and trade. Classical welfare estimates were made for producers, 
consumers, taxpayers, and for the U.S. and European Community as a whole using the foregoing conceptual 
framework. 
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Table 5. European Community Producer Prices, 1986. 
Ratio of Countr:y Price to EC-12 Average Price 
Commodity Average F.R. United 
EC-12 Germany France Kingdom Italy 
($/MT) (Ratio) 
Beef 3,024 1.01 1.06 0.92 1.08 
Pork 1,561 0.95 1.09 0.90 1.27 
Milk 263 1.06 0.93 0.83 1.30 
Butter 3,469 0.98 1.09 0.68 1.46 
Cheese 3,829 0.89 0.87 0.53 1.79 
Powder 1,994 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wheat 182 1.14 0.95 0.89 130 
Corn 183 1.10 0.83 1.00 1.29 
Coarse Grain 161 1.12 0.89 0.92 1.32 
Soybeans 208 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sugar 459 1.02 0.94 0.73 0.98 
Source: Authors' calculations from individual country prices provided by Mary Ann Normile, USDA; ERS. 
Impact on Prices 
Results in Table 6 indicate that the level at which EC prices are harmonized has a considerable impact 
on U.S. and world prices. Differences in world prices with high or low supports in the EC are sizable in several 
instances. In the case of pork, world prices are estimated to rise 5 percent if EC prices are harmonized to U.K. 
levels but to fall14 percent if EC prices are harmonized at Italian levels. In the case of sugar, world prices rise 
14 percent if harmonized at U.K. levels and remain nearly unchanged if harmonized at Italian levels. 
The extent to which U.S. prices reflect world prices depends on the degree of U.S. market intervention. 
Price transmission elasticity is low for sugar -- the 13.61 percent increase in world sugar prices estimated for 
harmonization of EC prices at U.K. levels results in only a 0.53 percent increase in sugar prices to U.S. 
producers. U.S. market price for sugar was about four times the world price in 1986. For U.S. pork and 
soybeans, relatively little insulated from world competition, the price transmission elasticities are near 1.0. 
As expected, impacts on U.S. and world prices are small with EC prices harmonized at average 
(unweighted) levels. Reductions in transportation and transaction costs associated with Europe 1992 could raise 
productivity and efficiency even at current average prices, an impact not included in the calculations for Table 
6. 
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The dairy sector is complicated by the many manufactured milk products complementary to fluid milk 
production and the minimal world trade in fluid milk. Although milk price supports are presumed to be 
unchanged by Europe 1992 because they now are nearly comparable among countries, milk and dairy product 
output is much influenced by incentives for other commodities which are substitutes or complements in 
production or consumption. 
Table 6. Impact on U.S. Producer Prices and World Prices of Harmonizing EC-12 Prices at U.K., EC-12 
Average, and Italian Levels. 
Changes in U.S. and World Producer Prices 
with Uniform EC Price Level of: 
U.K. EC Average Italy 
Commodity u.s. World u.s. World u.s. World 
(percentage increase) 
Beef 2.14 4.01 -0.07 -0.13 -1.76 -3.27 
Pork 4.60 4.96 -0.61 -0.66 -12.55 -13.54 
Milk 2.06 NA -0.51 NA -4.19 NA 
Butter 4.92 NA 0.30 NA -5.02 NA 
Cheese 10.12 NA -2.37 NA -15.94 NA 
Powder -0.37 -3.07 0.95 8.20 -0.61 -5.03 
Wheat 1.65 4.07 0.36 0.90 -2.02 -4.98 
Corn 0.47 0.90 -0.34 -0.65 -3.88 -7.39 
Coarse Grain 1.29 2.49 0.15 0.29 -4.34 -8.35 
Soybeans -0.17 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 
Sugar 0.53 13.61 0.02 0.57 0.04 1.07 
Impact on Production 
International price changes in Table 6 cause estimated changes in production in the U.S. and the EC 
shown in Table 7. The lower U.K. prices restrain EC production which raises world prices and U.S. production. 
The price of milk powder in the U.K. is relatively high compared to the price of cheese (Table 5), causing EC 
powder production to rise and world powder prices to fall (Table 6). The relatively low world and U.S. prices 
for powder and butter compared to the price for cheese under U.K. prices cause production adjustments shown 
in Table 7. The higher support prices in Italy for milk and cheese cause world and U.S. price changes 
constraining U.S. production of milk and cheese. 
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Impacts of EC 1992 on U.S. sugar and wheat production are small in part because these commodities 
are shielded from world market prices. The impact on soybean production is small because oilseeds receive less 
support and protection under the CAP than do other crops, and prices are the same throughout the Community. 
Any change is due to cross effects in production with other EC field crops. 
Table 7. Impact on Production of Harmonizing EC-12 Prices at U.K., EC-12 Average, and Italian Levels. 
Changes in Production with Price Level of: 
U.K. EC Average Italy 
Commodity u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 
(percentage change) 
Beef 1.29 -5.25 -0.01 - 0.16 -0.46 2.50 
Pork 4.34 -6.39 -0.50 1.46 - 11.01 20.36 
Milk 1.03 -3.90 -0.23 2.25 - 1.75 8.09 
Butter - 5.09 6.58 2.50 -8.74 11.15 - 19.28 
Cheese 5.39 - 20.81 - 1.59 9.17 - 9.19 45.39 
Powder -4.89 7.94 2.40 - 10.32 10.68 - 22.96 
Wheat 0.78 -7.13 0.29 - 1.90 0.03 6.31 
Corn 0.09 4.71 -0.20 2.29 - 1.70 11.27 
Coarse Grain 0.61 - 1.56 0.06 1.18 - 2.32 12.75 
Soybeans -0.15 -1.11 0.05 - 1.03 0.58 -2.29 
Sugar 0.12 - 15.29 -0.02 - 1.48 0.21 -2.03 
Impact on Consumption 
As a general rule, price support adjustments in the EC-12 drive consumption and production in opposite 
directions. Although corn and other coarse grain prices were allowed to fall from current levels to the U.K. price 
!eve~ both production and consumption of these grains increased in the U.S. in the face of higher world prices 
for both feed grains and livestock. Prices increasing relatively more for livestock than for feed grains stimulated 
livestock production and expanded feed grain demand quantity (Table 8). 
Percentage impacts (absolute value) of different EC price levels on U.S. consumption are less than on 
production because the bases from which percentages are computed are larger for consumption. Impacts on 
consumption are relatively large, however, for some commodities. In the case of pork, U.S. prices are estimated 
to be approximately 8 percent higher if the higher Italian support rate is chosen rather than the lower U.K. rate. 
13 
Cheese prices at the Italian level are estimated to expand U.S. consumption 12 percent above the level with U.K. 
prices. 
Table 8. Impact on Consumption of Harmonizing EC-12 Prices at U.K., EC-12 Average, and Italian Levels. 
Changes in Consum:gtion with Price Level of: 
U.K. EC Average Ita I~ 
Commodity u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 
(percentage change) 
Beef -0.77 2.43 0.01 . -0.30 0.40 - 1.50 
Pork - 1.98 3.77 0.28 0.08 6.12 -9.04 
Milk 1.03 -3.90 -0.23 2.25 - 1.75 8.09 
Butter -2.40 18.10 -0.15 - 1.46 2.62 -18.64 
Cheese -4.24 21.53 1.07 -3.09 7.82 -24.18 
Powder 0.20 - 1.50 - 0.51 1.01 0.33 3.94 
Wheat -0.29 0.89 -0.26 0.50 -0.94 0.98 
Corn 1.50 -7.19 -0.02 - 1.43 - 2.34 1.65 
Coarse Grain 1.29 -0.40 -0.34 2.18 -2.63 4.35 
Soybeans -0.23 -0.17 0.04 0.03 0.52 0.38 
Sugar 0.07 2.85 -0.09 -0.85 -0.98 0.48 
The impact of high EC prices is quite different on feed grains if the intermediate length of run is 
considered. Corn and other coarse grain consumption is estimated to be 4 percent lower in the U.S. under the 
high Italian EC price support than under the U.K. price support. 
Impact on Trade 
Unequal changes in production (Table 7) and consumption (Table 8) are associated with trade changes 
depicted in Table 9. With the low U.K. price level, the EC experiences a trade reversal from an exporter to an 
importer of pork, butter, and cheese and from an importer to an exporter of corn. Corn prices in the EC remain 
the same while lower meat and dairy production reduce demand for corn. At the same time, falling coarse grain 
prices shift production toward corn. Decreased EC demand coupled with increased EC production results in 
a change from importer to exporter of corn. 
Exports of beef are reduced by 596,000 tons. The U.S. is a major beneficiary, expanding beef exports 
by 238,000 tons. Major gains are also made by the U.S. in pork, cheese, and wh·:at exports with prices set at low 
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levels in the EC. On the other hand, U.S. beef, pork, and cheese exports are substantially reduced with EC 
prices set at Italian levels. 
Table 9. Impact on Trade of Harmonizing EC-12 Prices at U.K., EC-12 Average, and Italian Levels. 
Changes in Trade with Price Level of: 
U.K. EC Average Italy 
Commodity u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 u.s. EC-12 
(increase, 1,000 tons) 
Beef 238 -596 -2 9 -99 309 
Pork 413 -1,1631 -51 160 -1,122 3,371 
Butter -15 -2151 14 -161 47 -50 
Cheese 232 -1,6711 -64 491 --410 2,770 
Powder -29 213 15 -258 61 -6091 
Wheat 528 -5,626 245 -1,650 302 3,959 
Corn -2,370 3,1242 -380 957 412 2,3672 
Coarse Grain -198 -679 148 -434 -59 4,988 
Soybeans -4 14 13 -13 140 -75 
Sugar 2 -2,538 5 -114 81 -349 
Trade reversal - EC changes from exporter to importer. 
2 Trade reversal - EC changes from importer to exporter. 
Large and seemingly puzzling results are apparent for corn and other coarse grains. The U.S. is 
predicted to have lower feed grain exports with lower (U.K.) than with higher (Italian) support prices in the EC. 
The reason for the seeming anomaly is that high beef, pork, and milk prices bring feed demands that are not met 
domestically even with higher feed grain prices in the EC, hence the world market expands for feed grain. The 
U.S. benefits from that expansion. The model assumes relatively high U.S. grain price supports set by Congress 
for the 1981 farm bill. With lower and more flexible U.S. grain price supports today, the U.S. would benefit 
more from expanded world feed grain demand. 
Table 10 lists percentage changes associated with the U.S. trade columns in Table 9. These percentages 
are relative to the 1986 U.S. net trade position given in the second column of Table 10. The 528 thousand metric 
ton increase in U.S. wheat exports at the U.K. level (Table 9) corresponds to 1.97 percent of total U.S. wheat 
exports (Table 10). 
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Table 10. U.S. Trade Changes. 
US Net Trade Percent Change in Trade with Price Level of: 
Commodity 1986 MT UK EC Average Italy 
Beef -739 32.22 -0.31 - 13.44 
Pork -470 88.07 - 10.88 - 239.15 
Butter 23 - 63.37 60.08 196.39 
Cheese - 107 218.90 - 60.38 - 396.93 
Powder 300 -9.65 5.12 20.34 
Wheat 26752 1.97 0.91 1.13 
Corn 39085 -6.06 -0.97 1.05 
Coarse Grain 7456 -2.66 1.98 -0.80 
Soybeans 20684 -0.02 0.06 0.68 
Sugar - 1697 0.10 0.30 4.79 
Welfare Analysis 
For some commodities such as soybeans, American producers are made worse off by lower price 
supports in the EC because the Community is a major importer from the U.S. Lower livestock and livestock 
product supports reduce demand for soybean meal. For most commodities, however, American producers are 
helped by lower price supports and are hurt by higher price supports in the EC because the EC expands exports 
or reduces imports under greater incentive to produce and less incentive to consume. Overal~ U.S. producer 
surplus expands $2 billion from the base level (1986 conditions) with U.K. prices and drops nearly $4 billion with 
Italian prices in the EC (Table 11). Thus American agriculture has up to a $6 billion stake in seeing that EC 
farm price supports are set at the low rather than at the high end of prices in individual countries of the EC. 
U.S. consumers lose from lower price supports in the EC in the intermediate run because higher world prices 
benefiting non-EC producers translate into higher food prices. Gains to American producers and taxpayers from 
lower EC supports more than offset losses to consumers so the U.S. as a whole benefits from a greater market 
orientation in the EC. 
The big gainer from harmonization of EC prices at a lower common denominator is the EC itself. To 
be sure, producers are worse off (Table 11). But gains to consumers and taxpayers more than offset producer 
loss. Deadweight losses from intervention are reduced from 1986 levels by supports at U.K.levels but are raised 
by supports at Italian levels. World welfare gain from harmonization at the U.K. level is $6,853 million. 
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Table 11. Welfare Effects of Harmonizing EC-12 Prices at U.K., EC-12 Average, and Italian Levels. 
Commodity 
Gain to: 
Producers 
Consumers 
Taxpayers 
Total a 
u.s. 
2,066 
-2,226 
___lli 
356 
Changes in Welfare with EC Price Level of: 
U.K. EC Average 
EC-12 U.S. EC-12 U.S. 
-15,561 
20,657 
1994 
7,090 
($million) 
-268 
341 
-67 
6 
2,126 
480 
249 
2,855 
-3,821 
4,492 
-955 
-284 
Italy 
EC-12 
36,086 
-29,914 
-6,902 
-730 
a Does not include gains or losses from changes in transaction and administration costs and from political rent-seeking activity. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The (not so) Common Agricultural Policy has allowed considerably different farm commodity price 
supports among countries administered through "green rate" currency exchange mechanisms and Monetary 
Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) as noted in Table 5. The level at which European Community farm price 
supports are harmonized, presumably by the end of 1992, can have a major influence on not only EC but also 
U.S. farm production, consumption, trade, prices, and economic welfare. This paper estimates such impacts for 
three scenarios. 
The common price support level adopted by 1992 is likely to fall between the now prevailing low level 
of the U.K. and the high level of Italy. But no clear basis exists to choose a single most likely level. On the one 
hand, recent EC actions on growth stimulants in beef, dairy, and hogs suggest tendencies toward high 
protectionism. On the other hand, the nagging pressures to reduce the CAP budget could place supports nearer 
the U.K.level. GATT negotiations also could press for supports nearer U.K.levels. Heavy demands on the EC 
to resuscitate newly emerging market economics of eastern Europe create pressure for less spending on the CAP. 
On balance, we anticipate moderating levels of real price supports in the EC. If our expectations are realized, 
modest gains are in store for U.S. agriculture from the implementation of EC 1992. 
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Endnotes 
1. If the U.S. and ROW are net exporters (or both are net importers), the conceptual framework and 
results for ROW applies to the U.S. Of course, world welfare impacts cannot be inferred from the U.S. 
and EC alone. 
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